Czy lokalne konflikty opinii mogą prowadzić do globalnego konsensusu? 
Rola strategicznego antykonformizmu w kolektywnym podejmowaniu decyzji
[Can local disagreements lead to a global consensus? The role of 
strategic anticonformity in collective decision-making]*

Arkadiusz Lipiecki (Big Data Analytics, WPPT, PWr, Wrocław)


Engaging with dissenting views, fostering productive disagreements or 
strategic anticonformity can benefit organizations as it challenges the 
status quo. The question arises, however, whether such strategic 
anticonformity ultimately leads to social polarization, which is not a 
desirable phenomenon. We address this question within an agent-based 
model of discrete choices. Using the way of modeling social responses in 
continuous opinion models, we propose a three-state q-voter model with 
anticonformity and bounded confidence. We analyze the model on a complete 
graph using the mean-field approach and Monte Carlo simulations. We show 
that strong polarization appears only for a small probability of 
anticonformity, which means that conformity combined with homophily 
enhances polarization. Our findings agree with results obtained 
previously in the group discussion experiment and within various 
continuous opinion models.


* Based on: A. Lipiecki, K. Sznajd-Weron (2022) Polarization in the 
three-state-voter model with anticonformity and bounded confidence,
Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 165(1), 112809 
(https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2022.112809)